Engineering Complex Systems with an Emphasis on Robustness: Utility-Based Analysis with Focus on Robustness by Baxter, Benjamin Andrew
  
 
 
ENGINEERING COMPLEX SYSTEMS WITH AN EMPHASIS ON ROBUSTNESS: 
UTILITY-BASED ANALYSIS WITH FOCUS ON ROBUSTNESS 
 
A Thesis 
by 
BENJAMIN BAXTER  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
 
Chair of Committee,  Richard J. Malak Jr. 
Committee Members, Daniel A. McAdams 
 Michael D. Johnson 
Head of Department, Andreas A. Polycarpou 
 
August 2013 
 
Major Subject: Mechanical Engineering 
 
 
Copyright 2013 Benjamin Baxter
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Engineered system complexity continues to increase rapidly, concurrent with the 
requirement for the engineered system to be robust.  Robustness is often considered a 
critical attribute of complex engineered systems, but an exact definition of robustness is 
not agreed upon within the systems engineering community.  Lack of a clear definition, 
makes it difficult to develop or utilize a quantitative measure of robustness.  Having a 
formal measure for robustness may not be considered necessary, but a lack of a specific 
measure results in the inability to communicate the desired level of robustness, inability 
to measure how various options impact robustness, and makes it difficult to measure 
tradeoffs between robustness and other engineering parameters. 
 The objective of this research is to examine robustness and how it can be attained 
in systems engineering.  In order to accomplish this objective, data from several 
scientific communities is examined to develop the meaning of robustness.  While 
definitions between and even within each community differ, a key attribute is present in 
each definition:  A robust system needs to maintain its core functions in the presence of 
internal and external changes.  The key component of the characteristic is that each 
function within a system has its own measure of robustness.  
 When robustness and engineering are discussed, Robust Design must be 
examined.  The scientific community uses variance as its measure for robustness. The 
Robust Design method has the adverse characteristic of forcing preferences upon the 
designer.  Examining the mean-variance approach with utility theory shows that it 
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imposes an increasingly risk averse position upon the designer.  This position may not be 
compatible with the designer’s true risk attitude, causing issues when applying the 
method. 
 To contend with this issue, a novel utility-based approach is suggested. The 
approach focuses on generating functional models of the proposed systems, which 
provide the designer with insight into which perturbations are relevant to the system and 
subsystems.  Additionally this approach incorporates utility theory to allow the designer 
to convey their preferences.  The utility-based approach allows the designer to convey 
their own preferences, while incorporating steps to ensure the final design is robust. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern systems continue to evolve and become more and more complex 
creating difficulty in ensuring the systems are robust. Most engineers would describe 
robustness as a desired quality of complex systems but the ambiguity in its definition 
makes it difficult to know when robustness is achieved in an engineered system. Some 
examples of systems that need to be robust include spacecraft and aircraft. A recent 
example of a complex system that failed to be robust is the Boeing 787. The new aircraft 
cost over $32 billion to design and is currently grounded due to battery issues [1]. The 
Boeing 787 experienced issues with their onboard lithium ion batteries. One plane 
experienced smoke from the batteries and was forced to land while another plane’s 
batteries caught fire on the ground. The exact cause of the thermal runaway in the 
batteries is not known but show that the airplane is currently not robust because it is 
unable to perform its function under anticipated conditions. Another example of a 
complex system not being robust is the F-22 Raptor and its oxygen-supply system. Pilots 
of the F-22 were experiencing hypoxia-like symptoms during high altitude flights 
causing several close calls [2]. It was discovered that a pressure valve on the flight vest 
and carbon filter caused the issues with the oxygen-supply system [3]. The issues were 
corrected by changing the valve, filter, and adding a backup oxygen system. The initial 
design of the F-22 resulted in a system that was not robust to its desired operating 
conditions (high altitude and high g). Both the Boeing 787 and F-22 show that 
robustness in systems engineering needs to be examined in further detail. 
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 The lack of a concrete definition makes it difficult to develop a quantitative 
measure to assess the level of robustness a system achieves and difficult to produce 
design methods that lead to robust systems. The absence of a concrete definition and no 
formal measure of robustness leads to the inability to perform several basic system 
engineering operations. These operations include, (1) communicating desired levels of 
robustness to others, (2) assessing the impact of various choices on robustness, and (3) 
trading robustness against other engineering considerations. The ambiguity in its 
definition and lack of agreed upon method leaves an opportunity for answering several 
research questions: What is the meaning of robustness in systems engineering? Is a 
quantitative measure of robustness needed in systems engineering? Can Robust Design 
be extended to engineer robust systems? 
To develop a concrete definition for robustness in engineering a literature review 
is performed on the term. A sound background is established on robustness by 
examining how the term is used within several scientific communities. Two scientific 
communities that often deal with robustness are biology and engineering. Biological 
systems are considered to be highly robust and the characteristics that make them have 
been examined in great depth within the community. For example a human metabolic 
system is robust to both infections and an unstable food supply [4]. The definitions used 
within the biological community is consistent and has some parallels with the definitions 
used within the engineering community. An engineering community that must be 
examined when discussing system robustness and design is Robust Design.  
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Robust Design is a method used to develop systems that maintain performance 
by minimizing its variance. Robust Design or Quality Engineering initially gained 
popularity in manufacturing domain and has since gained popularity in other areas of 
engineering [5-7]. The method is sometimes used as a way to design robustness into a 
system. A key issue with the use of Robust Design is that it imposes preferences upon 
designers. A key attribute of a good design method is that it does not impose preferences 
upon the designer [8]. These imposed preferences are examined using utility theory, 
showing that they may not be reasonable. 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of Robust Design a utility-based approach 
for higher system robustness is developed. Utility theory allows designers to formulate 
their preferences within a utility function and allows for the comparison of designs with 
multiple attributes under uncertainty [9]. The elicited utility function includes the 
preferences of the designer, in this case if the designer is concerned about robustness it 
will be present in their preferences and the utility function they elicit. The approach 
consists of eleven steps for increased system robustness. A key aspect of the approach 
include performing functional modeling on the system and subsystem functions. The 
functional modeling provides insight into which perturbations are relevant and need to 
be included within the system model. The goal of the utility-based approach is to provide 
the designer with valuable information on where additional resources such as time and 
money should be spent in order to develop a more robust system. 
A case study is performed using the utility-based design approach. The case 
study examines the entry, descent, and landing of a Mars rover similar to the Mars 
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Curiosity landing sequence. The case study exhibits how the utility-based design 
approach aids in providing designers with information on relevant perturbations and 
where additional resources can be spent to increase robustness. Functional modeling 
forces the designers to take time and model what energy, material, and information 
interact  with each subsystem. The improved design is able to maintain its function in the 
presence of internal and external perturbations. 
Section 2 is broken down into a literature review of robustness and functional 
modeling. Section 3 examines variance as an inverse measure of robustness and 
background into utility theory. Section 4 examines the foundations of Robust Design and 
the preferences imposed onto the designer when this method is used. Section 5 presents 
the utility-based design approach for higher system robustness. Lastly, section 6 exhibits 
the utility-based design approach on a case study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Robustness is often considered a crucial aspect of well-engineered systems but its 
definitions ambiguity causes issues on how to achieve it. What is the meaning of 
robustness in systems engineering? The purpose of this section is to determine the 
definition of robustness in systems engineering. The definition of robustness is analyzed 
by examining different scientific fields’ definition of the term. The scientific areas 
examined include engineering, economics, and biology. Specific areas within 
engineering are examined in further detail allowing for an increased understanding of the 
term. In order to ensure adequate understanding of the scope of the term, related terms 
such as resilience and reliability are investigated. A general engineering definition is 
proposed within the section. Robustness focuses heavily on maintaining function under 
changes in anticipated internal and external properties. 
A review of functional modeling is included in this section. Different functional 
models approaches are reviewed in order to understand the utility-based approach used 
in Section 5. The functional models used include black box models, EMS (Energy, 
Mass, and Signal) Function Structures, and hierarchical functional models.  
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2.1. Survey of Terminology 
2.1.1. General Robustness 
 The term robustness is used differently in biological, engineering, economics and 
other scientific communities. However, the precise definition of the term often is not 
agreed upon within a given community. Typically, the root form of the term—the word 
robust—invokes some notion of vigor, strength, consistency, or sturdiness. 
Inconsistencies emerge when trying to make the term sufficiently precise to permit 
measuring robustness.  
 The existing lack of consistency among precise definitions very well may stem 
from the nature of the term itself. Table 1 contains the definition of robust from the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary [10]. 
 
 
Table 1: Definition of “robust” found in Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 
A) Having or exhibiting strength or vigorous health 
B) Having or showing vigor, strength, or firmness 
C) Strong formed or constructed 
D) Capable of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions 
 
 
 
 The four different definitions show how widely people apply the term robustness 
as an adjective. One can use it to show health, constructed strength, and ability to 
perform in different conditions. The common threads between each definition are that 
they are all positive and describe a system or thing that is strong or capable of 
performing.  
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 The use of robustness can be further broken into specific scientific disciplines. 
Table 2 contains a representative sample of definitions for robustness from different 
scientific communities. Alternative definitions exist in each community, but these were 
found to be among the most common in their disciplines. 
 
 
Table 2: Sample of definitions for robustness in different scientific communities. 
Biology 
Robustness is a property that allows a system to maintain its 
functions against internal and external perturbations [11]. 
Economics 
The relationship between economic growth and a particular variable 
is ‘robust’ if the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant 
and if the theoretically expected sign under permutations of the set 
of conditioning variables [12]. 
Engineering 
Robust systems should not produce radical departures from 
expected behavior in response to minor changes to operating input, 
internal state, or external environment [13]. 
Manufacturing 
A robust system has minimal sensitivity to variations in 
uncontrollable influences [14]. 
 
 
 
 The biological, engineering, and manufacturing definitions are similar in the 
respect that the system must maintain its nominal function or behavior in the presence of 
internal and external changes. However, only the manufacturing definition has sufficient 
specificity to indicate how to measure robustness (via sensitivity to variations). The 
economic relationship differs from the others in that it represents the relationship 
between economic growth and a variable. Yet it still relates to a consistency or lack of 
sensitivity in a relationship of interest. In order to gain more insight an in depth 
examination of robustness is done in both the biological and engineering fields. 
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2.1.2. Biological Robustness 
 Biological systems are believed to be highly robust to perturbations. This 
property is considered to be developed from evolution. However, even though biological 
systems are robust to most perturbations, they are still vulnerable to certain failures. An 
example of this is the human metabolic system, which is robust to infections and 
unstable food supply but susceptible to low-energy utilization lifestyles [4].  
Biological systems contain several factors that contribute to their robust performance. 
These characteristics include redundancy, feedback control, and modularity [15]. 
Redundancy allows a system to perform a specific function through alternative ways. In 
biological systems redundancy is achieved by having several systems capable of 
performing the same function. Feedback control allows the system to regulate an output 
by comparing it to a reference.  
 Modularity implies that cells are “semiautonomous entities” [16]. Cells with 
modularity exhibit a high number of internal function connections and a low number of 
external function connections. This autonomous capability allows cells to be less 
influenced by the environment due to their low number of external environment 
connections. This lower susceptibility to changes in the environment in turn increases 
the cell’s and system’s robustness to environmental perturbations.  
 Some view robustness as involving a tradeoff between fragility, performance, 
and resources [11]. The tradeoff between robustness and fragility is illustrated in a 
simple example shown in Figure 1. The fire prevention plan shown in A is adequate 
against forest fires moving from west to east but susceptible to forest fires moving from 
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south to north. Plan B places the vegetation in a circular fashion around the city 
protecting the city from fire in all directions. The drawback to this plan is that if the 
vegetation does catch fire the entire city will be surrounded by fire. Plan C calls for the 
removal of all vegetation around the city, allowing the city to be completely protected 
from forest fires but susceptible to other natural disasters such as flooding. This example 
shows that improving the systems robustness against a certain perturbation can cause 
susceptibility in another perturbation. Other methods for defending the city from wildfire 
can be developed but these are used as a simple example.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: City fire countermeasure plan showing the tradeoff between robustness and 
fragility [11]. 
 
 
 
 Kitano proposes a metric for robustness that gives a different robustness score for 
different combinations of the system feature being perturbed and the degree of 
perturbation [11]. This allows one to compare two or more systems as well as to 
understand whether certain features or functions are more or less robust to perturbation. 
Figure 2 is an example of how Kitano proposes to visualize the results to compare 
systems. In this case, Systems A and B have the same number of failures (matrix 
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elements colored red), but System A has better overall performance retention than 
System B (more matrix elements are colored dark blue).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Degree of perturbation versus features that are perturbed [11]. 
 
 
 
 In this notation,  ( ) is an evaluation function for how well a particular system 
function performs under perturbation. For a system,  , and a function,  , under a 
perturbation  , its definition is shown in Equation (1): 
 
  
 ( )  {
 if system failure
  ( )
  ( )
if no failure
 (1) 
where a system failure means the intended functionality is not met ,   ( ) is a 
performance metric for system function  ,   ( ) is the performance under nominal 
conditions, and   ( ) is the performance under perturbation  . 
 From this basis, Kitano defines the robustness of system function   as Equation 
(2): 
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  ∫  ( )  
 ( )  
 
 (2) 
where   is the set of possible perturbations and  ( ) is the probability of perturbation  . 
Thus, Kitano’s robustness score is the expected value of evaluation function  ( ). 
 Each system function will have a different evaluation function value and 
therefore a different robustness value. An advantage of this approach is it allows of each 
function to be analyzed separately, yielding multiple robustness scores. This can provide 
an observer increased insight into which aspects of a system are non-robust and which 
perturbations this is encountered. In engineering, such information can be the first step in 
taking remedial measures to improve robustness in key areas. 
 However, a key disadvantage of this approach is that the evaluation function, 
 ( ), lacks generality and may be difficult to apply in engineering. For example, it 
assumes: 
1. A nominal operation condition is known (so that   ( ) can be evaluated)  
2. The nominal operating condition is nonzero (to avoid dividing by zero) 
3. Each function is characterized by a single performance function,   ( ) 
4. Increasing values of the performance metric   ( ) are preferred 
Although some of these assumptions can be relaxed, others are more difficult to avoid in 
engineering. For example, engineering systems typically are characterized by multiple 
figures of merit. Even a single function of a system may have multiple figures of merit. 
Thus, although the biological robustness quantification framework has some advantages 
and desirable properties, it is unsuitable for direct application in engineering systems 
development. 
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2.1.3. Engineering Robustness 
 One can find the term robustness throughout the engineering literature. However, 
different authors tend to use it differently in different contexts—readers are left to 
determine its specific meaning in a particular instance. One finds the term robustness in 
many engineering specialties, including system design and controller design. Each 
discipline may use the term differently causing some confusion about the exact 
definition of robustness. Table 3 is an overview of the different definitions used in 
systems engineering and control engineering. 
 
 
Table 3: Definition of robustness within different engineering communities. 
Systems 
Engineering 
Robust systems should degrade gradually and gracefully in 
response to component failures, changes in operating environment, 
and when design loads are exceeded [13]. 
Median Performance of the system should be within customer 
specs [17]. 
Performance of the system should be independent of variance [17]. 
Controls 
The control must also be structurally stable or robust, in the sense 
that regulation of e to zero in the steady-state occurs even in the 
presence of “small” perturbations of the original system parameters 
[18]. 
Robust control refers to the control of unknown plants with 
unknown dynamics subject to unknown disturbances [19]. 
 
 
 
 The distinction between function and behavior becomes an issue when one 
considers these definitions. In engineering, particularly in engineering design, it is 
common to consider a function as a transformation of energy, material, or signal that 
 13 
 
engineers sometimes express using a verb-noun pair [20]. For example, the function of 
an internal-combustion engine is to “transform energy” (chemical to rotational 
mechanical). In comparison an engineer would describe the behavior of an internal-
combustion engine using one or more performance metrics, such as its efficiency in 
performing the transformation, the amount of power it can produce, etc. However, this 
firm distinction between function and behavior do not necessarily hold outside of the 
engineering disciplines. Although the definition for robustness from the biological 
sciences community is explicitly in terms of function (Table 2), the robustness measures 
developed based on this definition relate more closely to behavior in the engineering 
sense. Thus, the biology community definition is similar to the engineering and 
manufacturing definitions. 
 It is interesting to note that although the biological systems robustness measures 
are in terms of behavioral attributes of the system, they advocate the measurement of 
robustness on a function-by-function basis [11]. Moreover, one obtains a different 
robustness score for each function of the system. This is a departure from the other 
communities surveyed, which do not generally discuss the possibility that one function 
or aspect of a system could be robust while another one is not.  
 Ultimately, all communities agree that for a system to be robust it must maintain 
its effectiveness—in functionality or behavioral performance—under uncertainty. The 
uncertainty may be caused from several different types of perturbations such as the 
external environment, internal components, or operating input. 
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2.1.4. Related Terms 
In order to adequately examine the definitions of robustness; related terms also 
have to be examined. These related terms include resilience and reliability. Resilience is 
defined as, “capacity of a system to react to an unpredictable perturbation in its 
environment and to come back to a nominal functioning state” [21]. Another definition 
presented for resilience is, “A resilient system can handle a wide range of contexts and 
can be adapted to other situations” [22]. The key difference between definitions for 
robustness resilience is that a resilient system should handle perturbations that are 
unpredictable or unanticipated; definitions for robustness tend to encompass only 
anticipated perturbations. Table 4 is a summary of additional characteristics of a resilient 
system. 
 
 
Table 4: Characteristics present in a resilient system [21]. 
1. Able to react quickly and efficiently to perturbations and threats. 
2. Able to monitor unexpected perturbations and threats. 
3. 
Able to anticipate environment changes that may impact the system and adjust to 
maintain function. 
 
 
 
 A resilient system shares many qualities of a robust system. For example, both 
resilient and robust systems are expected to react efficiently to perturbations from 
internal components or the external environment. The two have some contrast in the fact 
that a robust system is not expected to “monitor” perturbations or threat but simply 
maintain its anticipated behavior. 
 15 
 
 An example of system that may be considered robust but not resilient is a 
Formula 1 race car. The car is set up specifically for each track and anticipated 
environment. For example a car may be set up for a curvy track with dry, sunny and 
90⁰F environmental conditions. The car can adjust to “minor” changes in the conditions 
such as temperature (±10⁰F), wear on tires, and amount of fuel in car. Using the 
engineering definition provided in Table 2 the system would be considered robust. In 
contrast a Formula 1 car may not be considered resilient due to its inability to adapt to 
unpredictable perturbations, such as oil on a track or loss of a fin. This lack of ability to 
adjust to major perturbations shows that the F1 car is not resilient but can still be 
considered robust.  
 Another term that shares a similar definition to robustness is reliability. 
Reliability is defined as the probability of successful system operation given known 
uncertainty in system and environment properties [23, 24]. Using this definition, 
reliability is a quantitative property that provides insight into the success of the system. 
Similar to robustness, reliability focuses on anticipated uncertainties that affect a system. 
One generally would consider an unreliable system to be non-robust. However, a system 
may be considered non-robust even if its probability of failure is within acceptable 
bounds.  
2.2. Functional Modeling Background 
 Functional modeling is used during concept design in order to develop how the 
product should unction. Modeling the function forces the engineers to focus on what 
rather than how it is to be achieved. Product function is defined as, “the overall intended 
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function of the product – what it is to do” [25]. Product functions are often a verb with a 
noun. For example the function of a coffee grinder is to make coffee grounds. Several 
different methods have been proposed in order to develop functional models for a 
design. These include function trees, black box models, and EMS function structures. 
Function trees or hierarchical functional models begin with global device function and 
develop what functions are needed to accomplish it below. Figure 3 is an example of a 
hierarchical function model. The advantage of hierarchical functional models is that they 
provide the designers with a top-down view of the product function. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Function tree of coffee mill [25]. 
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 Black box models take a different approach from function trees and model the 
product as a black box with three types of inputs and output. The inputs into the black 
box model are material, energy, and signal flows. Figure 4 represents the basic black box 
model of a product. 
 
 
Product Function
Energy
Material
Information
Energy
Material
Information
 
Figure 4: Black box model with energy, material, and information. 
 
 
 
A black box model treats the system as an empty box and is only concerned with 
the energy, material, and information that enters and exits the system. Generating black 
box models is a crucial first step to developing EMS Function Structure. EMS Function 
Structures examine the internal interactions within the system. A function structure is 
defined as, “input-output model that maps energy, material, and signal flows to a 
transformed and desired state” [25]. The function structure is a systematic approach for 
modeling system functions. Figure 5 shows the function classes, basic functions, and 
synonyms used in function structure. 
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Figure 5: Function classes, basic functions, and synonyms used in EMS functions 
structures [26]. 
 
 
 
The basic functions are used to describe the energy, mass, and signal flows 
through the product. Developed guidelines validate the developed EMS Function 
Structure [25]. One of the main guidelines for developing the EMS Function Structures 
is conservation of mass and energy. Function modeling specifically function trees, black 
box models, and EMS Function modeling is a crucial component of the approach 
developed in Section 5. 
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2.3. Literature Review Conclusion 
 The definitions of robustness examined in the previous sections have several 
similarities. Key components of robustness include maintaining function and uncertainty 
in internal and external properties. Functional modeling is introduced in order to 
examine the concept of robustness on a per function basis. For the purposes of this thesis 
robustness in Systems Engineering will be defined as a property that allows a system to 
maintain its functions against anticipated internal and external perturbations [13, 21, 27]. 
A general definition of Systems Engineering robustness opens the door to examine 
possible quantitative measures of robustness such as variance. 
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3. QUANTITATIVE MEASURE OF COMPLEX ENGINEERING ROBUSTNESS 
 
 In order to accomplish several basic system engineering operations a quantitative 
measure of robustness is required. This leads to important questions: Is a quantitative 
measure of robustness needed in systems engineering? Is variance an adequate measure 
of robustness or is a new metric required? In this section we examine variance as an 
inverse measure of robustness and its application of robustness on a per function basis. 
 Variance is a good measure for manufacturing robustness but its extension to 
complex engineering poses problems. Another approach is examined to include the 
designer’s preference of robustness into the design process without explicitly measuring 
it. Utility theory is a framework for making decisions. In this section Utility Theory and 
is ability to express the designer’s preferences are also examined. 
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3.1. Complications of Using Variance as an Inverse Measure of Robustness 
 A system with low variance in its response is considered robust in Robust Design 
[28]. Following the definition in Section 2.3 variance would need to be measured on a 
per function basis. Consider a design problem with four functions. Four separate figure 
of merit variances would need to be measured but combining the variances becomes 
difficult. Is each function equivalent in importance or is one more important than the 
others? How small does each variance need to be in order to ensure robust functions? If 
each figure of merit is in different units how can their variances be combined? Variance 
works well in terms of manufacturing robustness but is limited in its application to 
systems engineering. Developing a general measure of robustness for systems 
engineering may not be the solution. Another approach is to not measure robustness but 
to allow the designer to elicit their preferences into the design process. 
3.2. Utility Theory Background 
 Utility Theory is a mathematically rigorous framework for making decisions 
under uncertainty. Introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the theory is based on 
several axioms that assert what it means to be “rational” [29]. These axioms imply a 
means for formalizing one’s preferences mathematically (via what is called a utility 
function) and a procedure for making decisions (choose the option that maximizes the 
expected value of utility). Although originally formulated for single-objective problems, 
it has been extended to the case of multiple objectives [30]. Both the single- and 
multiple-objective formulations have been investigated in the engineering design 
research literature [31-35].  
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 Let   denote some figure of merit (often referred to in the literature as an 
attribute) that is uncertain and modeled probabilistically. A utility function over   is 
denoted  ( ). According to utility theory, a rational decision maker seeks to maximize 
the expected value of utility shown in Equation (3): 
          
   
 [ ( )] (3) 
where   is the feasible set for values of  . Here it is understood that the figure of merit is 
a function of some underlying design variables and impacted by some uncertainty that 
may be internal or external to the system. Let   denote the designable variables and   
denote the uncertain variables. Thus, one has   (   ) , which parallels the mapping 
   (   ) in Robust Design. Typically in an engineering design problem, one searches 
the space of designable variables directly. However, this discussion will be limited to the 
attribute space (i.e., the  -space) without loss of generality. 
 A utility function conveys complete information needed to understand a decision 
maker’s preferences. This includes their risk attitude—how they deal with risk due to 
uncertainty in a decision problem. To explain clearly the meaning of risk attitude, it is 
helpful to introduce the concept of a lottery. Let 〈     〉 denote a chance event in which 
one wins   units of a variable with probability   and   units with probability    . An 
individual is considered risk averse if they prefer the expected consequence of a non-
degenerate lottery to that lottery [30, 36]. A non-degenerate lottery is one in which no 
outcome occurs with probability one. For example, a risk averse individual would prefer 
to take 50 cents with certainty rather than engage in the lottery 〈         〉 (i.e., a lottery 
that pays $1 with probability 0.5 and $0 otherwise—and therefore has an expected value 
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of fifty cents). A consequence of this definition is that one’s utility for the expected 
value of the lottery is larger than the expected utility for the lottery. Let  ̃ denote a non-
degenerate lottery. Equation (4) demonstrates this for a risk averter: 
  ( [ ̃])   [ ( ̃)] (4) 
Another important concept is the certainty equivalent of a lottery, which is the amount 
one would take to be indifferent between that amount and the lottery. Let  ̃ denote a 
lottery and  ̂ denote its certainty equivalent. Equation (5) denotes the utility at the 
certainty equivalent. Equation (5) can be written as the inverse shown in Equation (6): 
  ( ̂)   [ ( ̃)] (5) 
   ̂     ( [ ( ̃)]) (6) 
where    ( ) is the inverse of the utility function. 
This leads to two more important concepts: 
 An individual’s risk premium for lottery  ̃ is the expected value of the lottery 
minus the individual’s certainty equivalent for that lottery. This is shown in 
Equation (7). 
   ( ̃)   [ ̃]   ̂   [ ̃]     ( [ ̃]) (7) 
 An individual’s insurance premium for lottery is the negative of that individual’s 
certainty equivalent for that lottery:   ( ̃)    ̂. 
The risk premium represents the amount by which the expected return on the risky 
option (the lottery) must exceed the value of a certain alternative (the certainty 
equivalent) for a decision maker to conclude the risk is worth taking. Thus, larger risk 
premiums imply a larger degree of risk aversion. On the other hand, the insurance 
premium is the amount a decision maker would be willing to pay to get rid of the risky 
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option (the lottery). Larger insurance premiums are a sign that the decision maker is 
unfavorable to the level of risk in an alternative. 
 It is possible to construct a useful measure of risk aversion that can be easier to 
interpret than an individual’s risk premium or insurance premium. An individual’s local 
risk aversion is defined as Equation (8) [36]. 
 
 ( )  
{
 
 
 
  
   ( )
  ( )
               ( )   
   ( )
  ( )
                   ( )   
 (8) 
This presumes that an individual’s utility function is twice differentiable. Notice the sign 
difference in the definition depending on the value ordering induced by  ( ). This is to 
preserve the semantics of the local risk aversion such that an individual is a risk averter 
if and only if  ( )   . Larger values of  ( ) mean one is more risk averse. 
Behaviorally, this means one would give up more in order to avoid the risk. 
3.3. Quantitative Measure of Robustness Conclusion 
 Developing a general quantitative measure of robustness is extremely difficult. 
Variance has been used as an inverse measure of robustness and while it may be 
affective in a manufacturing sense it is difficult to extend to systems engineering. One of 
the major issues of applying variance as a measure of robustness is combining the 
variance terms in systems that have multiple functions. From this it is determined that 
robustness should not be explicitly measured. A possible solution is to allow the 
designer to elicit their preferences within a utility function. Another possible solution is 
to extend Robust Design or quality engineering to systems engineering. 
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4. ROBUST DESIGN AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 
Robust Design also known as quality engineering must be examined when 
discussing robustness. Robust Design is examined because it is a design method that 
tries to maintain performance without eliminating the variance or uncertainty in the 
system. Can we extend Robust Design to engineer robust systems? In this chapter 
background on how Robust Design was developed from the perspective of quality loss is 
examined. Originally developed with the goal of developing quality products fast and 
with low cost Robust Design’s purpose has expanded since its inception [6]. The 
foundations of Robust Design were originally developed by Taguchi in order to decrease 
the cost to manufacture a product and still maintain high quality in the product. Early 
quality loss engineers supported the use of a quadratic loss function. The quadratic 
quality loss function has been manipulated into a mean-variance function. The mean-
variance approach is often taken as a design methodology that develops robust systems. 
Supporters of Robust Design claim that it is a simple yet effective way to 
develop robust systems. The assumptions and preferences placed upon the designer 
when using his approach are unexamined within the Robust Design field. Utility theory 
is employed within this chapter to investigate the preferences placed upon the designer 
and whether or not they are realistic. 
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4.1. Robust Design Background 
 Robust Design, also referred to as Quality Engineering, is an approach used by 
engineers to design systems and products. The foundation of the method is credited to 
Genichi Taguchi. Robust design aims to eliminate the sensitivity a product has to 
uncontrollable factors such as manufacturing variability and environmental conditions 
[7, 37-40]. As put in one text, “a product or process is said to be robust when it is 
insensitive to the effects of sources of variability, even though the sources themselves 
have not been eliminated” [41].  
 Fundamentally, Robust Design is a parametric optimization scheme in which one 
seeks a solution that is insensitive to small to moderate scale perturbations to the 
operating point of the system. Figure 6 is an illustration of this concept. Function  ( ) 
represents an objective function that one wishes to maximize. Mathematical optimization 
aims to find the global maxima while Robust Design aims to find the robust optimum. If 
uncertainty is present in   a system designed at the global optimum may fall into the 
valleys present on each side of the optimum. The Robust Design optimum will be more 
consistent in performance if there is uncertainty in the value of variable   (e.g., due to 
manufacturing variability).  
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Figure 6: Performance of a system may have global and robust optimal. 
 
 
 
 The parameters of a system can be divided into control, noise, and signal factors. 
Signal factors represent the range of possible configurations that may occur during 
system operation. Noise factors represent parameters that are expensive or unable to be 
controlled and that are subject to uncertainty. Control factors are the design variables 
and are adjusted to obtain the optimal robust solution. In this context, a robust system or 
product is one that is insensitive to variability in noise and control factors [42]. Type 1 
Robust Design focuses on minimizing variation caused by the noise or uncontrollable 
factors. Type 2 Robust Design focuses on minimizing the variation caused by the design 
variables or control factors [43]. Figure 7 is an illustration of the difference between 
Type 1 and Type 2 Robust Design. Although the ultimate aims are the same—design a 
system for which the response is insensitive to the uncertainty—one may benefit from 
different techniques depending on the type of problem. 
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Figure 7: Robust design type comparison [43]. 
 
 
 
 Robust design methods are based upon the quadratic loss function which is a 
target-seeking equation. The quadratic loss function is the squared difference between 
the response and the target value. Equation (9) shows the basic form of the quadratic loss 
function, 
  (   )  (   )  (9) 
where   is the system response and   is the desired target value. Generating a response 
that is away from the target is undesirable because it equates to loss of quality in a 
system. The response,  , is normally a function of noise factors,  , and control factors,  . 
As stated before noise factors are uncontrollable and are modeled using probability 
density functions causing both the response and loss values to be random variables. 
Minimizing the expected loss subject to any constrains is the overall objective and is 
shown in Equation (10). 
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 [( (   )   ) ] 
subject to 
  (   )            
(10) 
The equality constraints shown are rarely used in the Robust Design literature. Equation 
(11) shows the expected loss function rewritten in terms of mean and variance, 
  [(   ) ]    
  (    )
 
 (11) 
where    and    are, respectively, the mean and variance of response  . Examining the 
equation it can be deduced that the objective of Robust Design is to minimize variability 
and deviation from target simultaneously. Additional freedom has been given to 
designers by introducing a reweighting term. Equation (12) shows the quadratic loss 
function with the additional reweight term [44], 
  [ ]     
  (   )(    )
 
 (12) 
where   is restricted to values between 0 and 1.  
 Another variation of the quadratic loss function is the square root of individual 
terms within the function. Taking this approach allows the equation to be in the units of 
the response variable. Equation (13) is the quadratic loss function taking the square root 
of individual terms. 
  [ ̃]     (    ) (13) 
This is not the same as taking the square root of the entire quadratic loss function. 
 Use of the quadratic loss function has led people to focus on mean and variance 
as key figures of merit in a Robust Design problem with variance serving as a 
 30 
 
quantification of robustness. In turn, some formulate a Robust Design problem as a 
multi-objective optimization problem in which mean response and response variability 
are the objectives to be optimized. Letting          , one can formulate this as 
shown in equation (14): 
    
 
[       ] 
subject to 
  (   )            
(14) 
where it is understood that      and    depend on  . Potential advantages of this 
approach include that it admits the use of multi-objective optimization techniques and 
that it provides flexibility to weigh the different factors (mean and variance) differently. 
 Analogous loss functions and problem formulations are possible for situations in 
which one seeks to maximize or minimize the response variable,  , rather than achieve a 
particular target value. This goes back to Taguchi, who proposed different techniques for 
each of the situations [7]. Extensions also exist for Robust Design with multiple 
responses (i.e.,   is a vector) [45, 46]. 
4.2. Utility Based Critique of Robust Design 
 It is constructive to consider Robust Design from a utility-theoretic perspective. 
The quadratic loss function shown in Equation (9) defines one’s preferences under a 
Robust Design scheme. To formulate this in a manner consistent with utility theory, let 
 (   )    (   )   (   ) , where   is the response and   is the target value for the 
response. To keep the results general to any targeted value, let      . This gives us 
the utility function shown in Equation (15). 
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  ( )    ( )      (15) 
According to utility theory, a rational decision maker seeks to maximize expected utility. 
The max expected utility of the quadratic utility function is shown in Equation (16). 
    
 
 [ ( )]    [  ] (16) 
Equation (16) can be rewritten as Equation (17) which is equivalent to (10). 
    
 
   
    [ ] (17) 
It is straightforward to see that this is a universally risk averse preference structure. It is 
known that a decision maker is risk averting over the entire decision domain if and only 
if the second derivative of their utility function is negative [30]. The second derivative of 
the utility function shown in Equation (18) is negative.  
    ( )
   
    (18) 
Thus, this is a risk averse preference structure.  
 One also can analyze the risk attitude of this preference structure through the 
local risk aversion function. Since   ( )      and    ( )    , the local risk aversion 
function can be determined from Equation (8) giving Equation (19). 
 
( )  {
  
 
 
              
     
 
 
               
 (19) 
The local risk aversion function (Equation (19)) is plotted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Local risk aversion as a function of difference between response and target 
value. 
 
 
 
The function has several key features to consider: 
 It is positive for all  . This means it is universally risk averting. 
 Risk aversion increases as one approaches the target value (recall that     
when    ). 
 It has a discontinuity at the origin (i.e., when    ) 
It is unclear whether a risk aversion relationship of this nature is reasonable. For    , 
risk aversion is an increasing function—i.e., one becomes more risk averse as the target 
value is approached. This is called Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA) and has 
some questionable behavioral implications. For example, suppose a decision maker who 
wishes to maximize wealth and is IARA. Suppose further that the decision maker is 
indifferent between the lottery 〈             〉 and the certain option     . The IARA 
implies that this same decision maker prefers the certain option       to the lottery 
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〈               〉 (i.e., the certainty equivalent is less than $1125). Both lotteries have 
the form 〈           〉, for some reference point   and perturbation    , and the 
perturbation size in both lotteries is identical (     ). However, the decision maker 
becomes more risk averse at larger values of money and therefore has a lower certainty 
equivalent and larger risk premium.  
 To understand how this risk attitude can seem questionable, consider that the 
second lottery is the same as saying that the decision maker will receive $1000 with 
certainty and engage in the lottery from Scenario 1, 〈             〉. Why should the 
extra certain earnings make one more risk averse? The example is shown in Table 5 and 
6. 
 
 
Table 5: Monetary example of IARA attitude and its implications. 
Scenario     Lottery 
〈           〉 
Expected 
Value 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
Risk 
Premium 
1 $150 $50 〈             〉 $150 
(  ) 
$125 $25 
2 $1150 $50 〈               〉 $1150 
(  ) 
<$1125 >$25 
 
 
 
Table 6: Equivalent Scenario 2 written in terms of Scenario 1. 
Original Scenario 2 
Lottery 
Equivalent Scenario 2 
Lottery in terms of Scenario 
1 lottery  
〈               〉       〈             〉 
 
 
 
This argument also would seem to hold for the target achievement case 
represented by Robust Design. Although the use of negative values can be unintuitive at 
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first, this is exactly the same as the monetary example: Scenario 2 represents a situation 
in which the decision maker is uniformly better off than in Scenario 1. To be more 
concrete, suppose a decision maker is concerned with variations in manufacturing of 
mechanical parts and   represents the difference between the actual manufactured 
dimension of a part and its nominal dimension (in units of mm). Both scenarios involve 
identical variability in the manufacturing outcome, but Scenario 1 has a worse mean 
outcome compared to Scenario 2 (by 2 mm). Even though the worst-case outcome in 
Scenario 2 is better than the best-case outcome from Scenario 1, an IARA decision 
maker places a larger risk premium on Scenario 2. This means the decision maker would 
pay more to rid themselves of the gamble represented in Scenario 2 than that of Scenario 
1—an unintuitive and unlikely situation. The example is described in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7: Engineering example of IARA attitude and it implications. 
Scenario     Lottery 
〈           〉 
Expected 
Value 
Certainty 
Equivalent 
Risk 
Premium 
1        〈             〉 -3 (  )          
2        〈             〉 -1 (  )            
 
 
 
An analogous argument can be made for values of    . Note that in this case, risk 
aversion increases as one approaches     from the right (i.e., as   decreases).  
 One important remark is that this analysis highlights how a decision maker 
following a Robust Design framework places more importance on variability as the 
target value is approached. This is not evident by inspecting the objective function 
typically employed in Robust Design. Moreover, simple inspection of the objective 
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function based on expected quadratic loss would lead many to conclude that variability 
and target-achievement are given equal weight. This unintuitive result represents a 
significant potential pitfall of using typical Robust Design techniques. Target-achieving 
preferences would appear to place some restrictions on the form of available utility 
functions and these restrictions may be problematic.  
4.3. Limitations on Target-Achieving Preferences 
 Let   denote some target value an individual wishes to achieve and let   denote 
the actual value of the corresponding figure of merit. From an engineering standpoint,   
is a function of variables over which the designer has decision-making authority. For 
notational convenience, let       represent the difference between the actual and 
targeted values. The individual’s decision objective will be to minimize this difference. 
Thus, the person’s utility function will be a function of  . Let   ( ) denote this utility 
function and assume it is twice differentiable.  
The following necessary conditions exist on this utility function: 
1.   ( ) is increasing for    . Alternatively stated:   
 ( )    for     
2.   ( ) is decreasing for    . Alternatively stated:   
 ( )    for     
3. The point     is a stationary point. Alternatively stated:   
 (   )    
These conditions imply the following results: 
1. The point     is a local maximum. Alternatively stated:   
  (   )    
2. The point     is a global maximum.  
These results are straightforward. Intuitively, since   ( ) is increasing until    , has a 
slope of zero at that point, and then is decreasing thereafter it stands to reason that     
is the global maximum of   ( ). A global maximum also is a local maximum. The 
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problem with a target-seeking utility function lies in the implications this has for risk 
attitude. Recall that an individual’s local risk aversion is defined as Equation (8). 
 The problem with target seeking is evident in the denominators of   ( )—local 
risk aversion is undefined at the target value. This is because     is a stationary point 
(zero slope). If   
  ( ) also goes to zero at    , it may be possible to evaluate the 
fraction using a limit. That possibility aside, this is a serious problem as it suggests that a 
decision maker seeking to achieve a specific target value will necessarily become 
infinitely risk averse as the actual value approaches the target value . 
 It is unclear whether this is reasonable behavior in the immediate neighborhood 
of a target value. However, as discussed previously, increasing absolute risk aversion is 
an unrealistic preference structure in many situations.  
 It is possible to avoid the problem of increasing risk aversion (and infinite risk 
aversion) by sacrificing the stationary point assumption. Moreover, by allowing a 
discontinuity in   ( ) and    , it is possible to approach the target with a decreasing 
or constant risk aversion. The cost of this of course is that the solution becomes difficult 
to define mathematically. Practically speaking, it may be more important to preserve the 
stationary point than the desired risk function behavior.  
 Note that this analysis assumed very little about the form of   ( ). For example, 
we did not assume it was based on the quadratic loss function or any other particular 
function. Thus, these results are very general and apply to any target-seeking preference 
structure. 
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4.4.  Robust Design and System Engineering Conclusion 
 Robust Design and target seeking design methods impose preferences upon the 
designer which may not accurately model the designer’s preferences. A design method 
should provide the designer with the ability to express their preferences in a 
mathematical framework. In addition a method should incorporate robustness into its 
steps without directly measuring robustness. This is due to the fact that robustness is 
difficult to measure and may not be applicable to every system. Due to these factors 
Robust Design is not extended to systems engineering. Instead a utility-based analysis 
for increased robustness described in the next section accomplishes these aspects. 
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5. UTILITY-BASED ANALYSIS FOR INCREASED SYSTEM ROBUSTNESS 
 
Section 4 shows the preferences placed on the engineering when using Robust 
Design to engineer a system. The imposed preferences may not match that of the 
engineers and alternatives need to be examined in order to design robust systems. In this 
section a utility-based approach for increased system robustness is presented. The 
approach allows for the designer to elicit their own preferences within the model. The 
eleven-step approach combines several key characteristics in order to develop a robust 
system. Key characteristics include insight into important perturbations and where the 
designer should spend additional resources in order to increase the robustness of the 
system. The key components include functional modeling, utility theory, and a 
sensitivity analysis. Each component is important in order to achieve the desirable 
characteristics. 
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5.1. Background 
 A utility-based design method provides several favorable characteristics when 
designing a system. Utility theory is a normative approach for comparing designs with 
multiple attributes under uncertainty [9]. The designer formulates a utility function that 
incorporates their preferences without imposing preferences on the designer. This 
characteristic allows the designer to develop the importance of maintaining function 
based upon their own preferences. The designer uses the developed utility function to 
rank order possible designs in order to select the design that best meets their preferences.  
The purpose of the utility-based approach is to provide valuable information to the 
designer on where to spend additional time and money in order to develop a system with 
higher robustness. The approach achieves this through providing information on which 
perturbations should be included and by forcing the designers to examine the sensitivity 
of the system/subsystem figures of merit. Focusing on each function is key when trying 
to develop a system with higher robustness. 
 The approach is to be started after the concept design stage has been completed. 
Functional models may have been created within the concept design stage but should be 
recreated once the general system design has been developed. Functional models should 
be created for each subsystem function; this requires the system to be broken down into 
subsystems and for the designer(s) to discuss each subsystems function. In order to 
measure the system’s and subsystems’ ability to maintain function, figures of merit for 
each must be determined. More than one figure of merit may measure a single function. 
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Elicitation of the system level utility function should be done using appropriate methods 
and assumptions.  
5.2. Utility-Based Approach for Increased System Robustness Steps 
The utility-based analysis with focus on robustness consists of eleven-steps: 
Step 1:  Model function(s) of the system and subsystems (Energy, Mass, and Signal 
(EMS) Function Structure, Function Tree, black box model, etc.)[25]. 
Step 2:  Determine figure(s) of merit for system and subsystems functions. 
Step 3: For each subsystem function, identify perturbations that impact functional 
performance. Model anticipated internal and external perturbations with appropriate 
probability density functions. 
Step 4:  At the system level, model any perturbations that affect the system as a whole. 
(Some perturbations may not impact individual functions, but may impact the system as 
a whole). 
Step 5:  Model each function's figure(s) of merit in terms of identified perturbations and 
relevant variables. 
Step 6:  Elicit system level utility function. Decisions With Multiple Objectives provides 
background on elicitation of utility functions. Make appropriate simplifying 
assumptions. 
Step 7:  Use optimization techniques to compute the maximum expected utility of the 
system (using appropriate sampling of perturbations). 
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Step 8:  Perform sensitivity analysis on figures of merit with respect to anticipated 
internal and external perturbations. This paper performs a one at a time sensitivity 
analysis of the uncertain parameters.  
Step 9:  Using the information gained from the sensitivity analysis, determine which 
system/subsystem functions are most susceptible to loss of function. Examine the range 
at which the system is able to perform each function. Examine figures of merit that have 
a high rate of change when a parameter is changed. 
Step 10:  For susceptible function(s), examine the use of different technologies, 
redundancy, and/or modularity [47]. 
Step 11:  Repeat steps 1-10 until system and subsystems adequately maintain function in 
terms of anticipated internal and external perturbations. 
5.3 Comparison of New Utility-Based Analysis To Standard 
 In this Section we compare the utility-based analysis to the standard utility-based 
design approach utilized in engineering. Method for the Evaluation of Design 
Alternatives (MEDA) was proposed by Deborah L. Thurston and is used as the standard 
utility-based design approach [34]. MEDA contained six major steps for implementing 
the design process. These six steps are matched with their closest counterpart in the 
utility-based analysis for increased system robustness. Table 8 shows a comparison of 
the two methods.  
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Table 8: Comparison of utility-based design methods. 
Utility-Based Analysis for 
Increased System 
Robustness 
Methodology for the 
Evaluation of Design 
Alternatives (MEDA) 
Differences 
Comments 
Step 1: Model function(s) 
of the system and 
subsystems. 
Step 1: Define design 
problem in terms of 
function. 
Utility-based analysis 
relies on explicitly 
modeling the functions 
using EMS Function 
Structures, Function 
Trees, and Black Box 
Models. 
Step 2: Determine figure(s) 
of merit for system and 
subsystems functions. 
Step 2: Distinguish between 
design criteria and design 
attributes. 
Both methods require 
definition of design 
criteria. The utility-based 
analysis links specific 
FOM(design attributes) 
with subsystems. 
Step 3: Determine relevant 
perturbations for each 
subsystem. 
 
Step is not specifically 
stated by MEDA but 
would be required to 
evaluate utility function. 
 
Step 3: Define acceptable 
attribute ranges. 
This step is not explicitly 
stated in the utility-based 
analysis for increased 
system robustness but 
must be completed in 
order to generate single 
attribute utility functions. 
Step 4: Model any 
perturbations at the system 
level. 
 
Step is not specifically 
stated by MEDA but 
would be required to 
evaluate utility function. 
Step 5: Model each 
function’s figure(s) of 
merit in terms of identified 
perturbations and relevant 
variables. 
 
Step is not specifically 
stated by MEDA but 
would be required to 
evaluate utility function  
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Table 8: Continued. 
Utility-Based Analysis for 
Increased System 
Robustness 
Methodology for the 
Evaluation of Design 
Alternatives (MEDA) 
Differences/ 
Comments 
Step 6: Elicit system level 
utility function. 
Step 4: Determine the worth 
imparted to the designer 
over the attribute range 
Step 5: Determine the 
multiattribute utility 
function 
Each method requires the 
elicitation of a system 
(multiattribute) utility 
function.  
Step 7: Use optimization 
techniques to compute 
maximum anticipated 
utility of the system. 
Step 6: Determine the 
tradeoffs between attributes 
which would be beneficial 
to the designer 
Both methods use a type 
of optimization to find 
best design solution 
based upon utility. 
Step 8: Perform sensitivity 
analysis on figures of 
merit. 
Both methods suggest 
using a type of sensitivity 
analysis. MEDA uses 
sensitivity to determine 
how much better an 
alternative is to another 
while the utility-based 
analysis for increased 
system robustness uses it 
to compare each 
subsystems ability to 
maintain their function. 
Step 9: Determine which 
system/subsystem 
functions are most 
susceptible to loss of 
function. 
MEDA does not examine 
alternatives based upon 
system/subsystem 
function but upon 
important design 
attributes. 
Step 10: For susceptible 
function(s), examine the 
use of different 
technologies, redundancy, 
and/or modularity. 
Designer must examine 
possible tradeoffs for 
increased cost for 
increased performance 
(robustness). 
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From the previous tables it can be seen that both methods are similar in their 
approach. Both methods required the elicitation of a multiattribute utility function. In 
addition both approaches required the designer to determine figure(s) of merits or design 
attributes for the design. The utility-based analysis takes several additional steps in order 
to develop systems and subsystems that are robust or able to maintain their functions. 
For example in step 1 MEDA simply defines the system in terms of function while the 
utility-bases analysis takes it a step further and forces the designer to produce functional 
models at the system and subsystem level. This provides the designer with additional 
information about relevant perturbations for the system as a whole and for each 
subsystem being designed. MEDA explicitly forces the designer to determine the 
acceptable ranges of attributes but this required in order to properly elicit single attribute 
utility functions needed to develop the multiattribute utility function. Both approaches 
use sensitivity analysis to examine the possible design solutions. MEDA uses sensitivity 
analysis to how much better an alternative is compared to another alternative while the 
utility-based analysis uses sensitivity analysis to determine which system/subsystem 
functions are susceptible to perturbations. The utility-based analysis is very similar to the 
approach developed by Thurston with additional steps focusing on improving system 
robustness. 
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6. CASE STUDY OF ENTRY, DESCENT, AND LANDING OF MARS ROVER 
 
In order to demonstrate the steps of the utility-based approach for higher system 
robustness a case study is performed in this section. The case study demonstrates the 
advantages of the steps described in Section 4. The case study examines the entry, 
descent, and landing (EDL) of a Mars rover. The EDL system possesses several 
advantages as a case study: system is comprised of several subsystems, contains 
complex dynamics, and contains several internal and external perturbations. The EDL 
system is broken down into four stages: entry, parachute descent, powered descent, and 
sky crane. Background on each stage is given in further detail within the section. 
Relevant internal and external perturbations are modeled and a robust system is created 
using the utility based approach. The steps described in Section 4 are executed following 
the prescribed procedure. 
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6.1. Background of the EDL System 
 In order to utilize the utility-based approach developed in Section 5 and complex 
case study is developed. The Mars Rover Entry, Descend, and Landing or EDL system is 
broken into four key stages: entry, parachute descent, powered descent, and sky crane. 
The main objective of the EDL system is to safely land the rover on the surface of Mars. 
In order to accomplish this goal the rover must land at a safe speed and within a certain 
distance of the scientific landing zone. The landing sequence is similar to the approach 
utilized by the NASA Curiosity Rover 1. A graphical representation of the EDL system 
is shown in Figure 9. 
 The EDL system is broken down into subsystems. The subsystems correspond 
with the four stages of the EDL system. Table 9 shows the system broken down into 
subsystems functions and objectives. The figures of merit for each subsystem function 
are also shown. The system and subsystem figures of merit are used within the utility-
based approach to determine the total utility of the system and in order to perform the 
sensitivity analysis. The design variables for the case study include the diameter of the 
parachute and the amount of rocket fuel carried onboard the EDL. Design constraints for 
the design problem include: number of rockets, max rocket thrust, crane speed, and rover 
mass. Table 10 lists the design variables and design constraints when designing the EDL 
system. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/index.html 
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Entry
(1-D)
Parachute Descent
(1-D)
Powered Descent
(2-D)
Sky Crane
(1-D)
8000 m
3000 m
20 m
 
Figure 9: Graphical representation of EDL system. 
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Table 9: Describes the function, objective, and figure of merit each stage of the EDL 
system. 
  Function Objective Figure of Merit 
S
y
st
em
 
Land 
Rover 
maximize success of mission Landing Safely 
minimize cost Cost 
S
u
b
sy
st
em
s 
Protect 
Rover 
Minimize damage to rover during 
descent 
Rover functionality 
Slow 
Descent 
minimize capsule speed at ejection 
elevation 
Capsule Velocity 
(Parachute Stage) 
Control 
Descent 
minimize y-position overshoot  y-position overshoot 
minimize x-position error x-position error 
Lower 
Rover 
minimize landing speed Rover Landing Speed 
 
 
 
Table 10: Design variables and constraints of the EDL system. 
Design Variables    LB UB 
  Parachute Diameter 0 m 20 m 
  Rocket Fuel Mass 0 kg 500 kg 
Constraints   Value Units 
  Crane Lowering Speed 0.2 m/s 
  Rover Mass  775 kg 
  Number Rockets 8 
   Max Rocket Thrust 3400 N 
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6.1.1. Dynamics of the EDL System 
 In order to develop and execute a design study on the Mars rover lander a 
dynamical model is developed. Figure 10 shows the free body diagram for each stage of 
the EDL system. The powered descent stage is 2 dimensional while the other stages of 
the EDL are 1 dimensional.  
 
 
Entry
(1-D)
Parachute Descent
(1-D)
Powered Descent
(2-D)
Sky Crane
(1-D)
8000 m
3000 m
20 m
(mEDL+mRover)g
FDrag
FDrag+FDrag Parachute
FDrag y
FWind
(MEDL)g+T
FRocket R 
FRocket L 
FDrag x
(mEDL+mRover)g
(mEDL+mRover)g
FDragT
(mRover)g
FRocket Right FRocket Left 
 
Figure 10: Free body diagram of each stage of EDL system. 
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The equations of motion are developed for each stage of the Mars rover lander from the 
free body diagrams. Equations (20) – (26) are the equations of motion for each separate 
stage of the EDL system. 
Entry Stage:  
 (           ) ̈        (           )  (20) 
Parachute Stage: 
 (           ) ̈                        (           )  (21) 
Powered Descent Stage: 
 (           ) ̈             ( )             ( )        
 (           )  
(22) 
 (           ) ̈              ( )              ( )        
       
(23) 
 
  ̈          
    
 
         
    
 
 (24) 
Sky Crane Stage: 
 (    ) ̈        (    )                      (25) 
 (      ) ̈    (      )  (26) 
The equations of motion for the EDL system are solved using MATLAB. The EDL 
system needs to be controlled in order to ensure that the rover lands within a certain 
distance of the objective at a certain velocity. 
6.1.2. Control of the EDL System 
 The powered descent and sky crane stages must be controlled in order to keep the 
system stable. This is accomplished by using separate PID controllers for the powered 
descent and sky crane stages. The objective of the controller in the powered descent 
stage is to slow the EDL’s descent and adjust x–position. Two controllers are utilized in 
 51 
 
order to achieve the stage’s objectives: attitude control and y–velocity [48]. The x–
position of the EDL is not directly controlled but adjusted for by controlling the attitude 
of the lander. The desired  –position is dependent upon both the x–position and x–
velocity. Equation (27) shows how    is determined, 
       
  (  (  (    )    ( ̇   ̇))) (27) 
where   ,   ,   ,and  ̇  are position constant, velocity constant, x–position  desired, and 
x–velocity desired respectively. To ensure that the EDL system does not spin out of 
control    is limited to    radians. The control force from the attitude control is shown 
in Equation (28) and (29). 
         (28) 
 
         
           
 
         
   
  
 
 (29) 
In order to determine the total control force during the descent stage the y–velocity must 
also be considered. The control force from the speed control is shown in Equation (30) 
and (31). 
   ̇   ̇   ̇ (30) 
 
         ̇
          ̇
 
   ̇  ̇     ̇ ∫   ̇      ̇
   ̇
  
 
 (31) 
The total control during the descent stage is the sum of the attitude control and speed 
control. Equation (32) and (33) shows the total control force for the EDL system during 
the descent stage. 
                   ̇            (32) 
                   ̇            (33) 
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 The objective of the PID controller during the sky crane stage of the EDL system 
is to maintain altitude. The control force is determined the same way as the attitude and 
speed control during the controlled descent stage. Equations (34) and (35) show the 
control force during the sky crane stage. 
         (34) 
 
                  
         ∫         
   
  
 
 (35) 
The combination of the attitude, speed, and altitude control allows the EDL system lands 
the rover safely on Mars.  
6.1.3. Cost Model of EDL System 
 The case study incorporates a cost model into the design process. Cost is an 
important aspect of designing systems. The tradeoff between cost and performance is 
crucial when examining the MARS EDL system. Cost is included to ensure that a robust 
system is developed without simply selecting the most expensive components due to 
their higher performance. The cost model is composed of the cost of EDL components 
(structure, rockets, and sensors), fuel amount, and parachute diameter. Cost-estimating 
relationships for theoretical first unit space missions are used to develop the model. 
Table 11 shows the cost of the EDL structure, rocket technology, and control system 
which includes the required sensors. 
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Table 11: Cost of EDL components including structure, sensors, and rockets [49]. 
Component 
Component 
Cost 
EDL Structure $75,000,000 
Control System (includes sensors) $3,000,000 
Rockets (8) $4,000,000 
Total $82,000,000 
 
 
 
In addition to the component cost the rocket fuel amount and parachute diameter 
contribute to the system cost. Equations (36) and (37) show the determination of cost for 
the parachute diameter and rocket fuel mass cost. 
               (
        
  
)
          
 
 (36) 
                  
     
  
 (37) 
During the design process the parachute diameter and fuel mass are the design 
parameters. The cost of the system will only be changed by the parachute cost and fuel 
cost during the optimization of the system. The other component costs (control system 
and rockets) are included in case one is determined to be underperforming and require 
and upgrade. 
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6.2. Apply Utility-Based Analysis Approach to Case Study 
 The steps for the utility-based analysis presented in Section 5 are applied to the 
Mars rover lander case study.  
Step 1: The system and subsystems are modeled using black box models, EMS function 
structures [25], and a hierarchical functional model. Figure 11 is the hierarchical model 
used to describe the EDL System. The main function of the Entry, Descent, and Landing 
module is to successfully land a rover on the surface of Mars. Each level below must be 
accomplished in order to satisfy the function above. The four functions that will be 
examined in greater detail include: slow descent, control descent, and lower rover. In 
order to examine these subsystems in greater detail both black box models and EMS 
Function Structures. 
 
 
Land 
Rover
Slow 
Descent
Protect 
Rover
Control 
Descent
Lower 
Rover
Dissipate 
Heat
Stop 
Debris
Convert 
ME (KE) to 
F_drag
Deploy 
Parachute
Eject 
Parachute
Detect 
Altitude
Convert CE 
to ME
Ignite 
Propellant
Store 
Propellant
Detect 
Speed
Convert EE 
to ME
Store 
EE
Actuate 
EE
Export
Rover
Detach
Rover
Control
Rate
Control
Thrust
 
Figure 11: Hierarchical functional model of EDL System. 
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In order to land the rover on Mars the descent must be slowed considerably. 
Figure 12 shows the black box model for the parachute descent stage of the system. 
 
 
Slow
Descent
ME 
(Translational)
ME (Translational),
ME (F_drag)
Capsule Slowed Capsule
Altitude
Energy Material Information
 
Figure 12: Black box model of parachute descent stage of EDL system. 
 
 
 
The energy entering the system is the capsule’s translational motion, while the 
energy exiting the system boundary is both translational and drag. The relevant signals 
or information during this stage is the capsule’s altitude. It is crucial that the altitude 
sensors error be modeled for this stage. The stage is examined further with an EMS 
Function Structure and is shown in Figure 13. 
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The next stage of the EDL system is the powered descent stage. Figure 14 shows 
the black box model of the function control descent or powered descent stage. 
 
 
Control
Decent
Chemical Energy Mechanical Energy
Rocket Fuel Spent Fuel
Y Velocity, Altitude,
X Velocity, X Position, Theta
Energy Material Information
Thrust Level
 
Figure 14: Black box model of the powered descent stage of the EDL system. 
 
 
 
Much more information is required during this stage of the descent. This is due to 
the both the Y velocity and X position controller. It is important to include the error 
present in the sensors during the design of the system. The powered descent EMS 
Function Structure is shown in Figure 15. The EMS Function structure iterates the 
importance of including all of the relevant sensor noise. The function structure also 
shows that the rocket thrust level is a crucial component of the stage. The required thrust 
and actual thrust may not be exactly the same and should be modeled within the design 
study. 
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The final stage to be modeled is the sky crane or lower rover subsystem. Figure 
16 represents the black box model of the Sky Crane stage. 
 
 
Lower
Rover
Rover, 
Rocket Fuel
Landed Rover, 
Spent Fuel
Altitude
Energy Material Information
Thrust Level
CE, EE
ME (Thrust), 
ME (rotational)
 
Figure 16: Black box model of the Sky Crane stage of the EDL system. 
 
 
 
The sky crane is possibly the most important stage of the descent. The altitude 
must be maintained in order to ensure that the rover lands at a reasonable speed and that 
the EDL system does not crash into the rover as it flies away. In order to ensure this the 
altitude sensor error and rocket thrust uncertainty must be included within the stage. 
Figure 17 represents the EMS Function Structure for the lower rover subsystem. The 
altitude sensor is crucial for knowing the amount of thrust required and the current 
position of the of the rover as it is lowered. It is also crucial that the EDL maintain the 
altitude so that the rover lands at a reasonable speed.  
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The developed functional models provide insight into the important internal and 
external perturbations. For example, from Figure 17 we observe that internal 
perturbations from speed and altitude sensors play an important role in the lower rover 
stage of the EDL system.  
Step 2: The system and subsystem figures of merit are shown in Table 9.  
Step 3: Using the figures of merit developed in step 2 and functional models in step 1, 
relevant internal and external perturbations to the system are modeled. Table 12 shows 
the perturbations along with their probability density function to be included in the 
system model. 
Step 4: Utilizing the black box and EMS function structure of the entire system, it is 
assumed that important perturbations are included and modeled in step 3; that is, no 
additional internal or external perturbations are modeled. 
Step 5: The subsystem figures of merit are modeled using MATLAB. The entire landing 
sequence is modeled in MATLAB. 
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Table 12: Subsystem internal and external perturbations and probability density 
functions modeling them. 
  
Probability Density Function 
Function Perturbation Type Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Slow 
Descent 
Air Density Value Normal 1 0.025 
Control 
Descent 
Rocket Output Value Normal 1 0.075 
Y Velocity Sensor Noise 
(Amplitude) 
Normal 
1% 
error 
0.1 
Y Velocity Sensor Noise 
(Frequency) 
Normal 1000 50 
X Position Sensor Noise 
(Amplitude) 
Normal 
1% 
error 
0.1 
X Position Sensor Noise 
(Frequency) 
Normal 1000 50 
X Velocity Sensor Noise 
(Amplitude) 
Normal 
1% 
error 
0.1 
X Velocity Sensor Noise 
(Frequency) 
Normal 1000 50 
Theta Position Sensor Noise 
(Amplitude) 
Normal 
1% 
error 
0.1 
Theta Position Sensor Noise 
(Frequency) 
Normal 1000 50 
Initial Position X Normal 100 30 
Initial Velocity X Normal -5 2 
Wind Velocity Log Normal 2.191 .4724 
Lower 
Rover 
Altitude Sensor Noise 
(Amplitude) 
Normal 
1% 
error 
0.1 
Altitude Sensor Noise 
(Frequency) 
Normal 1000 50 
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Step 6: The system level utility function is developed. The two figures of merit used to 
measure the system utility are landing safely and system cost. One key assumptions is 
made when developing the system level utility function: mutual utility independence and 
multilinear utility function [25]. Equations (38) - (40) shows the utility function 
developed for landing safely, system cost, and total system utility. 
 
  (              )    
  (     )    
(38) 
  (    )            
              (39) 
      (     )                      (40) 
Step 7: The optimal system design is computed by using optimization techniques to find 
the maximum system utility. Latin Hypercube sampling is used to sample the 
perturbations developed in step 3. Table 13 shows the results obtained using 
optimization. 
 
Table 13: Results from optimization of total system utility. 
E(Utility) 0.620 
Diameter 15.28 m 
Fuel 459.9 kg 
 
 
 
The calculated landing percentage is 65.8% with a 95% confidence internal from 
62.7% - 68.7%. The current system performance is unacceptable and needs to be 
examined more. 
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Step 8: A one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis is performed on the uncertain parameters. 
That is, one parameter is varied while the others are maintained at their nominal 
condition. Table 14 shows the parameters examined in the analysis. 
 
 
Table 14: Parameters examined in the sensitivity study. 
Parameter Nominal Value 
Altitude Error (Amp.,Freq.) 1%, 1000 rad/s 
Y Velocity Error (Amp., Freq.) 1%, 1000 rad/s 
X Position Error (Amp.,Freq.) 1%, 1000 rad/s 
X Velocity Error (Amp., Freq.) 1%, 1000 rad/s 
Theta Error (Amp., Freq.) 1%, 1000 rad/s 
Wind Speed 10 m/s 
X Position 100 m 
X Velocity -5 m/s 
 
 
 
 Figure 18 shows the sensitivity analysis of landing safely for two perturbations. 
The output thrust and air density perturbations are examined due to their small range of 
operation. The other thirteen perturbations can successfully land for a much larger range 
of perturbations and are not included on the plot.  
 
 
Figure 18: Range of landing safely versus change from nominal of parameters. 
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 The speed of the EDL system at parachute ejection or slow descent subsystem is 
examined in Figure 19. Only the air density parameter is examined because the other 
parameters do not interact with the system until after the parachute has been ejected. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Parachute ejection speed (stage: parachute stage) under different parameter 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 Next analysis plots examine the control descent subsystem of the EDL system. 
Two characteristics are important when examining the powered descent stage: X landing 
position and Y overshoot percentage. Figure 20 - 22 demonstrate the variation in X 
landing position under various parameter conditions. Altitude error and Y velocity error 
are not examined due to their negligible effect on the x landing position. 
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Figure 20: X landing position (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions. Analysis of wind, output thrust and air density. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: X landing position (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions. Analysis of x position sensor and x velocity sensor. 
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Figure 22: X landing position (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions. Analysis of theta sensor and x initial conditions. 
 
 
 
Figure 23 and 24 show which parameters change the Y overshoot. X position 
error, X velocity error, Theta error, X initial position, and X initial velocity are not 
included due to the minimal change in Y overshoot when these parameters are changed. 
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Figure 23: Y overshoot percentage (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions. Analysis of wind, output thrust, and air density. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Y overshoot percentage (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions. Analysis of altitude sensor and y velocity sensor. 
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 Analysis plots are generated for the landing speed to examine the sky crane 
subsystem. Figure 25 and 26 show the landings speed variation versus change from 
nominal condition. X position error, X velocity error, Theta error, X initial position, and 
X initial velocity are not included because the landing velocity remains within 0.01 m/s 
under their change from nominal. 
 
Figure 25: Landing speed (stage: sky crane) under different parameter conditions. 
Analysis of wind, output thrust, and air density. 
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Figure 26: Landing speed (stage: sky crane) under different parameter conditions. 
Analysis of altitude sensor and y velocity sensor. 
 
 
 
Step 9: The one at a time sensitivity analysis generated in step 8 provide crucial 
information into which system and subsystem functions are susceptible to changes in 
perturbations. Figure 18 shows landing the rover successfully on the Martian surface is 
most susceptible to changes in air density and output thrust. The range of successful 
landing for changes in air density are 0.91 to 1.09 of nominal value. Figure 27 shows the 
probability density function of the air density. 
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Figure 27: Probability Density Function of the air density. 
 
 
 
The probability that the air density is outside acceptable range is nearly zero. 
This shows that the designed system is capable of maintaining function within the 
anticipated perturbation. The cost that would be required to decrease the error present in 
the air density model is far too high to justify it.  
 The rocket output uncertainty is of much higher concern. The successful range 
for landing the rover on Mars for the rocket output ranges from 0.895 to 1.06 of the 
nominal value. The probability of the rocket output to be outside the land safety range is 
too high. Figure 28 represents the probability density function of the rocket output. The 
system is unable to handle the current probability density function for rocket output. 
Investigation into possible solutions will be examined in the next step. 
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Figure 28: Probability Density Function of the rocket output. 
 
 
 
 The Powered Descent stage is concerned with both X landing position and Y 
overshoot percentage. Figure 20 shows that the X landing position is again susceptible to 
parameter changes in air density and output thrust while able to handle large changes in 
wind speed. Figure 21 and 22 exhibit that the powered descent stage is able to handle 
parameter changes in to all of the sensor error amplitudes and frequencies. The Powered 
Descent stage is also capable of handling changes within the X initial position and X 
initial velocity. 
 The Y overshoot percentage is highly susceptible to parameter changes in the air 
density and output thrust similar to the X landing position. The Powered Descent Stage 
is capable of handling the anticipated values of air density but the output thrust is again 
of higher concern. Figure 24 shows that the Y overshoot is susceptible to parameter 
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changes in the altitude amplitude sensor noise. The max Y overshoot value is 
approximately 1.27%. This still leaves plenty of room for overshoot and is within 
acceptable range. 
 The sensor noise becomes more of an issue when examining the Sky Crane 
subsystem. Figure 26 shows how the altitude amplitude sensor noise is of greater 
concern than originally thought. As the amplitude is increase the landing speed 
increases. The landing speed approaches 0.4 m/s. While this value is still quite small, 
investigation into possible solutions for the altitude amplitude are investigated in the 
next step. 
Step 10: Uncertainty in rocket output is shown to be of concern in step 9. This 
information shows where the designer(s) of the EDL should spend additional time to 
ensure a robust system. Adding additional rockets or redundancy to the system does not 
change the uncertainty of the rocket output. This would not be a suitable solution. 
Modularity also does not offer suitable solution to the issue of rocket output. Another 
option is to examine different rocket technology in order to reduce output uncertainty. 
For this case study, it is assumed that more expensive rocket engines can be used with a 
normal distribution mean of 1 and variance of 0.02. The more expensive rocket engines 
produce a PDF shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29: Probability density function of new rocket engines. 
 
 
 
The improved characteristic of the rocket output should help the EDL system in 
all aspects including: landing safely, X landing position, and Y overshoot percentage. 
The downside of the improved rocket is the increased cost per rocket. The increased cost 
will be included when the optimization step is repeated. 
 Another issue discovered is the altitude amplitude sensor error. Step 9 shows that 
the Sky Crane subsystem figure of merit landing speed is highly dependent upon the 
altitude sensor. In order to combat this issue, a more expensive sensor is utilized to 
reduce the error from sensor noise. The improved sensor has an average error amplitude 
of 0.5%. Table 15 shows the new sensor and rocket cost for the improved EDL system. 
The increased cost will also be included when the optimization step is redone. 
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Table 15: Cost of new altitude sensor and rockets. 
Component Cost (Per Unit) 
Original Altitude Sensor $500,000  
New Altitude Sensor Cost $525,000  
New Rockets $530,000  
 
 
 
Step 11: For this step, the optimization is repeated with the improved rockets and 
improved altitude sensor. The optimal solution with the improved sensor and rockets is 
shown in Table 16. 
 
 
Table 16: Results from optimization using improved sensor and rockets. 
E(Utility) 0.740 
Diameter 15.19 m 
Fuel 456.9 kg 
 
 
 
The calculated landing percentage is 95.2% with a 95% confidence internal from 
94.4% - 97.0%. The current system performance is much more acceptable then the initial 
design. The successful landing rate increased almost 30% over the original design. This 
is a huge improvement showing that the changes made to the system improved the 
system robustness.  
 The important one at a time sensitivity analysis plots are recreated using the new 
design parameters. The operational limits at which the EDL system successfully lands is 
not changed greatly from the initial design. This makes sense because the design 
parameters are close to their initial values. Figure 30 shows the range of successful 
landing for the output thrust and air density. 
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Figure 30: Range of landing safely with improved altitude sensor and rockets versus 
change from nominal of parameters. 
 
 
 
The Y overshoot is reduced slightly by improving the altitude sensor and rocket 
noise. Figure 31 and 32 shows the Y overshoot as a function of change in nominal value 
of various parameters. 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Y overshoot percentage (stage: powered descent) with improved sensor and 
rockets under different parameter conditions. Analysis of wind, output thrust and air 
density. 
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Figure 32: Y overshoot percentage (stage: powered descent) with improved sensor and 
rockets under different parameter conditions. Analysis of altitude sensor and y velocity 
sensor. 
 
 
 
The nominal overshoot is reduced to 0.66 % while the maximum overshoot 
occurs when either the output thrust and air density is reduced from their nominal value. 
The landing speed is a critical measure of the sky crane stage of the EDL. Figure 33 
shows the landing speed with the improved altitude sensor and rockets. The nominal 
landing speed is lowered considerably from approximately 0.36 m/s to 0.22 m/s. The 
reduction in landing speed ensures that the rover is not damaged when landing.  
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Figure 33: Landing speed (stage: sky crane) with improved sensor and rockets under 
different parameter conditions. Analysis of wind, output thrust, and air density. 
 
 
 
The landing speed due to altitude sensor noise is reduced to a range of 0.15 m/s 
to 0.25 m/s. The previous design had a maximum landing speed of 0.4 m/s, reducing that 
to 0.25 m/s is a significant improvement.  
 The X landing position sensitivity plot with improved rockets and altitude sensor 
is shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: X landing position (stage: powered descent) under different parameter 
conditions with improved altitude sensor and rocket output. Analysis of wind, output 
thrust, and air density. 
 
 
 
The X landing position shows why the output thrust and air density fail at 
approximately 90% of their nominal value. The EDL system is required to land the 
system within 10 m of the target site. From the x landing plot it can be seen that the EDL 
rarely overshoots the target. The target x position can be shifted from 0 m to -5 m in 
order to increase the range at which the EDL safely lands the rover. Figure 35 shows 
how shifting the X target to -5 m shifts the X landing more within the safe landing zone. 
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Figure 35: X Landing position with new X target landing position of -5 m. 
 
 
 
Shifting the X target landing position increases the range at which the EDL 
system is able to land the rover. The optimization is rerun a third time and gives the 
results shown in Table 17. 
 
 
Table 17: Results of optimization after adjusted x-landing position. 
E(Utility) 0.742 
Diameter 15.03 m 
Fuel 456.9 kg 
 
 
 
Figure 36 shows that the range of the output thrust and air density successful 
landings are expanded when adjusting the target X landing position. 
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Figure 36: Range of landing safely with adjusted X target landing position. 
 
 
 
While adjusting the X target landing position did not change the upper limits of 
the range of landing safely it did have a large change on the lower limit. Under these 
new parameters the rover lands safely 97.3% of the time with a 95% confidence interval 
from 96.0% to 98.2%. 
6.3. Mars Rover Entry, Descent, and Landing Case Study Conclusion 
 The case study shows several key characteristics of the utility-based design 
methodology for increasing system robustness. Key results from case study: 
 The EDL expected utility is increased from .620 to .742. 
 The susceptible functions of the EDL were Control Descent (uncertainty in rocket 
output) and Lower Rover (altitude sensor error). 
 The EDL successful landing percentage increased from 65.8% to 97.3%. 
 The EDL system and subsystems are able to maintain function under internal and 
external perturbations. 
 
Key takeaways form case study: 
 Function modeling on a system/subsystem level provides insight into relevant 
perturbations at both the system/subsystem level. 
 Sensitivity analysis of each function provides designer with insight into which 
system/subsystem function is susceptible to loss of function. 
 The approach allows the designer to elicit a utility function with their preferences. 
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The creation of functional models provides the designer of the system with 
important information about subsystem interactions and perturbations. Both the Black 
Box Models and EMS Functions structures (Figure 12 - 17) show each function and their 
relevant perturbations. The designer then uses the knowledge gained from the function 
models to develop accurate PDFs of relevant perturbations and generate system models 
that include the relevant perturbations.  
Utility Theory allows the designer to elicit a system level utility function in 
accordance to their preferences. This is crucial because if the designer is concerned 
about robustness it will show up in their preferences. Using optimization techniques with 
the generated PDFs and system models the design with highest expected utility is found. 
If the utility-based analysis method did not include any further steps the designer would 
not have insight into where additional improvements could be made. This is a crucial 
difference between MEDA and the utility-based analysis method proposed here. 
The sensitivity analysis examines how a change in the perturbations values 
affects the system/subsystem figures of merit. This provides the designer with insight 
into where to spend additional time and money. Simply examining the system level 
figure of merit in Figure 18 would not have led to examination of the altitude sensor but 
solely the rocket output. This is critical because the adjustment of both the altitude 
sensor and rockets improved the system’s ability to perform its function drastically. 
Examining the subsystem function in Figure 26 shows that the landing speed varied due 
to the error in the altitude sensor. The improved rockets and altitude sensor increased the 
successful landing percentage from 65.8% to 95.2%. This is almost a 30% improvement 
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by changing only two components of the system. Additional examination of the X 
landing position in Figure 34 allowed for further improvement to the system. The EDL 
rarely overshot the landing target but may not have had enough time to get within the 
safe landing zone. Adjusting the X target landing position from 0 m to -5 m increased 
the safe landing percentage to 97.3%. The final design parameters are shown in Table 
17. 
 Each step of the utility-based approach is an important step required to develop a 
more robust system. Determining the relevant perturbations and examining design 
changes to reduce their effect on the system generates a system that is able to maintain 
its function. The EDL system created in the case study exhibits robust characteristics, 
that is, it is able to maintain function in the presence of anticipated internal and external 
perturbations.  
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7. SUMMARY 
 
 Systems engineering continues to design and engineer more complex systems. 
These complex systems need to meet difficult performance characteristics while 
maintaining high system robustness. A general definition or method for measuring 
robustness is not agreed upon within the engineering community. The definition of 
robustness is different among scientific communities and even within specific 
engineering communities, while most definitions contain attributes of strength and the 
ability to carry out a function. For this thesis, robustness is defined as a property that 
allows a system to maintain its functions against anticipated internal and external 
perturbations [13, 21, 27].  
 Robust Design is a method used within engineering for developing systems with 
low sensitivity to noise or uncontrollable factors. Robust Design accomplishes this by 
utilizing the quadratic quality loss function. The quadratic loss function can be written in 
terms of mean and variance where the objective is to minimizing distant to target while 
also minimizing variance. This mean-variance approach to design forces preferences 
upon the designer that may not match the designers preferences. Examining Robust 
Design in terms of utility theory shows that the quadratic loss function has an increasing 
risk aversion attitude. When designing a system this risk attitude may not be rational. In 
order to combat this issue a utility-based analysis for increased system robustness is 
proposed.  
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 The utility-based analysis for increased system robustness combines functional 
modeling, utility theory, and sensitivity analysis. The utility-based analysis provides 
steps to increase the system robustness without using a quantitative measure for 
robustness. Utility theory allows the designer is able to express their own preferences 
within the design process. The functional modeling provides a structured method for 
modeling the functions of the total system and its subsystems. This provides the designer 
with insight into the important perturbations. The sensitivity analysis allows the designer 
to examine which system and subsystem functions are maintaining their function and 
which functions should be examined in greater detail. All of these steps combined helps 
the designer to design more robust systems. 
 The Mars rover lander case study shows how a complex system can be designed 
using the utility-based analysis for increased system robustness. The initial design had a 
successful landing rate of 65.8%. Using the utility-based analysis the final design has a 
97.3% successful landing rate. The functional models and sensitivity analysis pointed 
out the susceptible functions and which perturbations were of the greatest concern. This 
is an improvement of over 30%. The final Mars rover lander design is able to maintain 
its function under internal and external perturbations. More case studies should be 
performed to test the utility-based analysis for increased system robustness. 
 Future work includes applying the Utility-Based Analysis for Increased System 
Robustness on more complicated system engineering examples. This includes systems 
that may have more than one system level function and several subsystem level 
functions. Examining more complicated design examples is key in order to assess if the 
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method helps the designer create robust systems. More case studies will also indicate 
where additional explanation of the method is required. 
 The research can be taken a step further by examining how to design resilient 
systems. A key step that needs to be examined in order to design resilient systems is 
coming up with the relevant perturbations. Possible ways to approach this could be to 
use the same methods that are used during concept design. These approaches could 
include: brainstorming, 6-3-5, morph matrixes. Resilient systems are also considered to 
be able to adapt to unpredictable environment changes which poses additional challenge 
when developing a design method. 
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